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 The Paris Agreement culminates a six-year transition toward an international climate policy 
architecture based on parties submitting national pledges every five years.1 An important policy task 
will be to assess and compare these contributions.2,3 We use four integrated assessment models to 
produce metrics of Paris Agreement pledges, and show differentiated effort across countries: 
wealthier countries pledge to undertake greater emission reductions with higher costs. The pledges 
fall in the lower end of the distributions of the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the cost-minimizing 
path to limiting warming to 2⁰C, suggesting insufficient global ambition in light of leaders’ climate 
goals. Countries’ marginal abatement costs vary by two orders of magnitude, illustrating that large 
efficiency gains are available through joint mitigation efforts and/or carbon price coordination.  
Marginal costs rise almost proportionally with income, but full policy costs reveal more complex 
regional patterns due to terms of trade effects.  
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The pledge and review approach formalized in the Paris Agreement requires a well-functioning 
transparency regime. Given the discretion left with national governments on the form of their mitigation 
pledges, or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), assessments are necessary to 
estimate and compare their impacts.  Such comparisons will be of interest to environmental 
stakeholders who want to pressure those countries with relatively modest mitigation contributions. 
Business stakeholders may focus on assessments of INDCs’ economic impacts, specifically energy price 
and cost impacts among trade partners.    
Beyond stakeholder interest, transparency and comparability can promote the stability and 
facilitate greater ambition of an international climate agreement. Transparent reviews serve to enhance 
the credibility and likelihood that a party will deliver on its announced pledge, especially with repeating 
rounds of pledge and review4,5,6. Assessments of pledges reveal countries’ preferences and interests1, 
enabling more-informed negotiations. International institutions to facilitate transparency – through the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on countries’ pledges – can lower the costs of 
international agreements and enhance their legitimacy7. Voluntary pledge and review can result in 
broad participation8,9, as evident in the Paris Agreement. In various contexts, including international 
trade and common pool resource management, the demonstration of reciprocal actions has resulted in 
fewer deviations from agreements and positive reactions by members of the agreement10.  
The long-term success of the Paris Agreement likely depends on assessments of whether 
comparable countries undertake comparable mitigation efforts. Such assessments are complicated by 
the variation in the form of pledges: targets specified in terms of a base year, a forecast, or emissions 
intensity; peaking year; renewable energy goals; etc.  Evaluating the comparability of mitigation effort 
highlights INDCs’ economic efficiency and equity implications, which may be critical to subsequent 
negotiations and related domestic mitigation actions. These assessments can characterize overall 
mitigation ambition, and add value to related analyses, such as UNEP emissions gap reports and 
Accepted Nature Climate Change 2016, doi:10.1038/nclimate3106, available online at 
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate3106.html.  
 
3 
 
academic papers11,12, that will inform the Paris Agreement’s global stocktakings. Let us enumerate how 
economic analysis can inform INDC assessments.      
 First, some INDCs, by design, require economic forecasts. Pledges based on reductions from a 
forecast emissions or emission intensity reflect model-based forecasts of emissions and/or GDP. 
Assessing their robustness to alternative assumptions and translating the pledge into emission levels 
requires modeling.  Second, stakeholders and governments will want apples-to-apples, comprehensive 
comparisons among INDCs.  This requires frameworks employing internally consistent data and 
modeling assumptions to produce comparability metrics. The national communications processes show 
that countries often produce measures of mitigation effort that are not comparable13.  Third, only 
integrated, multi-country assessments can account for cross-border impacts of INDCs occurring via 
international trade. Fourth, economic analyses of INDCs can focus attention on policy learning14–16, by 
illustrating opportunities for more cost-effective domestic policies and highlighting the benefits of 
bilateral linking of domestic programs 17. Finally, assessments at this stage can identify the data and 
modeling needs for ex post review of INDCs.  
 To identify metrics for our analysis, we first define mitigation effort as the emissions, energy, 
and economic outcomes that occur as a result of explicit implementation of domestic mitigation 
programs. We consider metrics – physical and economic outcomes such as emissions, prices, and 
aggregate economic activity – that are comprehensive, measurable and replicable, and universal2,3. No 
single metric satisfies all three principles.  Some metrics – emissions relative to a base year, changes in 
emission intensity, and energy and carbon market prices – are observable but not comprehensive. 
Deviations from forecast emission levels and/or the economic costs of such deviations are the most 
comprehensive measures, but neither universal nor easily measurable.  Recognizing these tradeoffs, we 
present a suite of emissions, prices, and cost metrics to provide a rich characterization of countries’ 
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pledged efforts.  We emphasize deviations from forecast emission levels and economic cost as the most 
comprehensive measures of mitigation effort. 
 Previous research evaluated the Copenhagen Accord pledges in terms of reductions from 2020 
emission forecasts to assess aggregate impacts18, and a broader set of economic metrics, with an 
emphasis on the impacts of emission trading19.  McKibbin et al20 compare the “stringency” of pledges by 
large economies using a subset of our metrics (carbon price, cost as a share of GDP). These studies are 
limited to one model.  Multi-model comparison projects (e.g.  EMF2221, LIMITS22, and AMPERE23) have 
primarily focused on long-term targets, although some research has considered national goals and used 
similar metrics24. 
Assessments of future mitigation effort are inherently uncertain25. Employing multiple metrics 
and multiple tools can serve to highlight the robust findings about INDCs and identify those impacts, 
policies, and goals that merit additional investigation. Policymakers and stakeholders may benefit by 
learning about how the INDCs compare with the SCC – in the context of maximizing net social benefits – 
and the cost-minimizing pathway to limiting warming to 2⁰C – in the context of cost-effective 
attainment of Paris’s long-term objective. Given uncertainties in the benefits of mitigating climate 
change and the trajectories of attaining temperature objectives, we use the SCC distribution produced 
by the US government and extract from the IPCC AR5 scenario database the distribution of all model 
runs that limit warming to no more than 2⁰C with a 50% probability (see Methods for details and 
caveats). Alternative approaches to incorporating uncertainty in modeling climate damages – such as in 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models26  – may better represent how uncertainty influences the 
SCC. We retain the USG SCC since it serves as a focal point for government decisionmaking. 
 To simulate, assess, and compare pledges, we have employed four integrated assessment 
models (DNE21+, GCAM, MERGE and WITCH; see Methods for details). These models differ in terms of 
regional, technological, sectoral and economic representation. We have simulated the contributions 
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submitted as of mid-February 2016: we have assumed cost-minimizing attainment of the INDCs’ 
emission goals. While the form of contribution varied among the countries we evaluated, the models 
produced a consistent set of emission, price, and cost metrics. We quantify the economic costs of 
mitigation scaled by GDP and the carbon tax for that country to achieve cost-effectively its pledge 
(Marginal Abatement Cost, MAC). As evident below, the two metrics are only partially related. We 
report metrics averaged between 2025 and 2030, given the variation in INDC target years. Table 1 
summarizes the modeling results. 
 Figure 1 shows the estimated emission reductions from business-as-usual in the major 
economies alongside marginal abatement cost and cost as a share of GDP. The results illustrate 
differentiated effort, with wealthier countries generally mitigating more emissions. Emission reductions 
correlate well with marginal costs but not with total economic costs, in line with the empirical 
literature27.  The DNE21+ model estimates higher total economic costs for South Africa (2.1%), which 
primarily reflects that model’s cross-border spillovers – including falling demand for South African coal – 
anticipated by near-global implementation of INDCs. Japan, a country with low emissions and fewer 
mitigation options compared to other industrialized countries, shows comparable costs as a percentage 
of GDP to the U.S. and EU, but fewer emission reductions and significantly higher marginal costs (in 
GCAM and DNE21+). 
 In Figure 2, we compare marginal costs across countries. The figure highlights the potential gains 
to international emissions trading and how mitigation efforts compare to global benefit estimates and 
2°C pathways.  The considerable variation in marginal costs suggests large gains to international 
cooperation: when simulating cost-minimizing global attainment of the Paris INDCS, the DNE21+, 
MERGE, and WITCH models estimate a global carbon price of 7-28 US$2015/tCO2e. Important 
institutional developments to promote joint mitigation measures among countries, including  
international emissions trading or carbon tax coordination, could deliver significant economic gains28,29.   
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We also compare the INDCs’ marginal abatement costs to the SCC and the cost-minimizing path 
to limiting warming to 2⁰C. The global carbon prices appear to be well below the mean SCC (SCC=57 
US$2015/tCO2 in 2030), but consistent with the lower end of the SCC distribution. Likewise, the marginal 
abatement costs fall below the mean cost associated with a cost-minimizing path to limiting warming to 
2⁰C. These comparisons may indicate insufficient ambition in the Paris Agreement in terms of global 
welfare and the long-term temperature objective. However, some countries bear marginal costs 
exceeding the mean marginal benefits or the mean cost-minimizing level of a 2⁰C objective, such as 
Japan and the EU as modelled by DNE21+.  
 To illustrate how mitigation effort varies with wealth, Figure 3 plots the estimated policy costs 
(both marginal costs and total cost expressed as a share of GDP) against per capita income. The figure 
reveals two regional clusters – one among emerging and developing economies and the other of high-
income countries. As a measure of the distributional impacts of INDCs, we compute a ‘burden elasticity 
of income’: the variation in policy costs (either marginal or total) for a percentage point increase in per 
capita income. For marginal abatement costs, we estimate a burden elasticity of 1.1 (SE=0.25, 
statistically significant at 0.1% level), suggesting relatively progressive distributional impacts of INDCs. 
When measured using total costs, however, the burden elasticity of income is below unity (0.42) and not 
statistically significant (SE=0.25). Higher marginal costs do not necessarily imply higher total policy costs; 
trade-exposed and carbon-intensive countries (e.g., many developing economies) tend to experience 
higher GDP losses for a given carbon price, as already shown by Stern  et. al. (2012). The models’ 
estimates only represent mitigation costs; they do not account for climate benefits or local air quality 
co-benefits. Nonetheless, there is significant variation across countries and models. Model assumptions 
matter.    
 Table 1 includes additional metrics that are less comprehensive than the cost and emission 
reduction from BAU measures and show how some metrics naturally favor certain countries.  Measuring 
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emissions versus a 1990 base year is unfavorable to emerging countries and those with faster 
population and/or economic growth (e.g., the United States). With a 2005 base year, the U.S. and EU 
appear comparable and, for reductions from 2025-2030 forecast levels, countries are more comparable 
(but with the income gradation noted above). The carbon and energy price metrics suggest comparable 
price increases for the U.S., EU, and Japan.  While the MERGE model estimates lower carbon prices for 
these countries than the other models, each model shows fairly comparable carbon prices among this 
high-income group. China, India, South Africa, and Russia have much smaller, comparable price impacts. 
Emission intensity tends to favor faster growing economies; China’s INDC shows a reduction in emission 
intensity similar to that of the United States.  
 The Paris Agreement is widely viewed as a success because of the design of an institutional 
framework it establishes, not its near-term mitigation outcomes.  Its continued success requires 
countries to deliver greater emission mitigation in subsequent rounds of pledging, which will depend on 
rigorous, transparent reviews of mitigation pledges and outcomes.  As the parties to the agreement 
work to implement the new transparency mechanism, economic analysis will be critical. Translating the 
various types of pledges in order to estimate aggregate effects and make apples-to-apples comparisons 
requires economic tools. The more comprehensive measures of mitigation effort require economic 
modeling, as do the consequences of global INDC implementation. Our work illustrates a framework for 
organizing future modeling of pledges to inform the transparency regime. Finally, economic modeling of 
INDCs can promote policy learning and cost-effective mitigation, which can enable the ratcheting up of 
ambition over time.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1:  Average 2025-2030 mitigation costs and emission reductions for the four models and seven 
major economies. Costs are scaled by GDP.  
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Figure 2:  Average 2025-2030 marginal abatement costs for the four models. The boxplots show the 
ranges of the USG Social Cost of Carbon and the marginal abatement costs in 2030 for scenarios 
consistent with 2°C, as in the IPCC AR5 database. The orange stars represent the mean and the boxes 
show the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles. See Methods for details on distributions of the SCC and cost-
minimizing path to limit warming to 2⁰C. The red, blue and green lines show the marginal costs 
predicted by three models assuming an international carbon market with free trade of CO2e permits or 
harmonized global carbon tax.  
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Figure 3:  Average 2025-2030 mitigation costs (marginal abatement costs on the vertical axis, and % GDP 
losses proportional to markers size) in relation to average 2025-2030 per capita income for the four 
models, and seven major economies.  
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Table 1. Ex ante assessment of the INDCs of select countries. 
  Average Annual GHG Emissions 2025-2030  Annual GHG Change (%)  CO2 Price  Energy Price Change (%)  Cost 
  Level vs. 1990 vs. 2005 vs. BAU  2015-25 2015-30  ($/tCO2e)  Electricity Gasoline Nat. Gas  (% GDP) 
U
S 
DNE21+ 5,091 -18 -30 -35  -4.38 -4.03  109  38 35 70  0.42 
WITCH 5,140 -5 -26 -35  -5.50 -4.29  101  38 53 72  0.76 
GCAM 4,358 -29 -34 -41  -4.83 -4.83  100  40 56 83  0.84 
MERGE 5,407 -7 -22 -21  -2.70 -3.68  40  48 22 28  0.28 
                 
EU
 
DNE21+ 3,733 -35 -30 -32  -2.73 -3.30  177  30 28 44  0.59 
WITCH 3,720 -32 -30 -32  -4.43 -4.39  116  12 39 91  0.51 
GCAM 3,500 -38 -32 -33  -3.73 -3.73  100  28 55 81  0.57 
MERGE 3,836 -30 -25 -25  -1.98 -3.01  45  29 29 31  0.31 
                 
Ch
in
a 
DNE21+ 17,353 338 109 -4  -4.62 -4.31  1  -5 -2 0  -0.20 
WITCH 16,526 413 91 -20  -4.39 -4.02  33  46 15 25  1.60 
GCAM 13,809 149 49 -8  -4.16 -4.05  12  9 5 7  0.04 
MERGE 13,086 250 77 -10  -3.83 -3.65  23  31 14 16  0.72 
                 
In
di
a 
DNE21+ 6,366 389 206 0  -1.83 -1.80  0  -4 -3 0  0.00 
WITCH 4,577 278 115 -1  -2.72 -2.61  0  0 -2 -1  0.59 
GCAM 5,007 220 121 -12  -2.65 -2.62  19  16 9 13  0.13 
MERGE 4,787 308 135 -2  -2.42 -2.52  0  2 6 7  0.12 
                 
Ja
pa
n DNE21+ 1,107 -13 -21 -20  -3.29 -3.54  283  48 49 36  0.47 
GCAM 1,139 -12 -21 -17  -2.27 -2.24  91  40 46 69  0.13 
MERGE 1,037 -12 -23 -20  -1.87 -2.23  43  26 25 29  0.22 
                 
So
ut
h 
Af
ric
a DNE21+ 525 50 18 -26  -2.38 -3.20  19  33 4 0  2.11 
GCAM 503 10 -12 -4  -1.00 -0.98  2  2 1 1  0.01 
MERGE 543 33 13 -12  -2.08 -2.38  39  49 32 27  0.64 
                 
Ru
ss
ia
 DNE21+ 2,383 -29 12 -9  -5.12 -5.00  4  9 2 11  0.23 
GCAM 2,481 -26 7 -7  -2.09 -2.23  2  3 0 0  0.01 
MERGE 1,767 -43 -12 -1  -2.17 -1.97  0  1 4 4  -0.47 
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Notes:  For the US, China, and Russia, we have employed the midpoint in their INDC range.  Marginal cost is aggregated based on mitigated 
emissions.  MERGE results are 2030. 
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Methods 
In order to generate the set of metrics shown in the main analysis, we have employed four 
integrated assessment models: DNE21+, GCAM, MERGE, and WITCH.  
  
Description of the models used in this paper 
DNE21+ 
DNE21+ (Dynamic New Earth 21 Plus) is an energy and global warming mitigation assessment 
model developed by RITE.30,31 The model is an intertemporal linear programming model for assessment 
of global energy systems and global warming mitigation in which the worldwide costs are to be 
minimized. The model represents regional differences, and assesses detailed energy-related CO2 
emission reduction technologies up to 2050. When any emission restriction (e.g., an upper limit of 
emissions, emission reduction targets, targets of energy or emission intensity improvements, or carbon 
taxes) is applied, the model specifies the energy systems whose costs are minimized, meeting all the 
assumed requirements, including assumed production for industries such as iron & steel, cement, and 
paper & pulp, transportation by automobile, bus, and truck, and other energy demands. The energy 
supply sectors are hard-linked with the energy end-use sectors, including energy exporting/importing, 
and the lifetimes of facilities are taken into account so that assessments are made with complete 
consistency kept over the energy systems. Salient features of the model include (1) analysis of regional 
differences between 54 world regions while maintaining common assumptions and interrelationships, 
(2) a detailed evaluation of global warming response measures that involves modeling of about 300 
specific technologies that help suppress global warming, and (3) explicit facility replacement 
considerations over the entire time period. The model assumes energy efficiency improvements of 
several kinds of technologies and cost reductions of renewable energies, carbon dioxide capture and 
storage (CCS) etc. for the future within the plausible ranges based on many literatures. 
Accepted Nature Climate Change 2016, doi:10.1038/nclimate3106, available online at 
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GCAM 
GCAM is an open-source model primarily developed and maintained at the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory’s Joint Global Change Research Institute.25,32 GCAM combines dynamic-recursive 
models of the global energy, economy, agriculture, and land-use systems with a reduced-form climate 
model, the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC). Outcomes 
of GCAM are driven by assumptions about population growth, labor participation rates and labor 
productivity in 32 geo-political regions, along with representations of resources, technologies and policy. 
GCAM operates in 5-year time-steps from 2010 (calibration year) to 2100 by solving for the equilibrium 
prices and quantities of various energy, agricultural and GHG markets in each time period and in each 
region. GCAM tracks emissions of 16 GHG endogenously based on the resulting energy, agriculture, and 
land use systems. GCAM is a technology-rich model. It contains detailed representations of technology 
options in all of the economic components of the system. Individual technologies compete for market 
share based on their technology characteristics (efficiency in the production of products from inputs), 
and cost of inputs and price of outputs. The market share captured by a technology is based on an 
implicit probabilistic (logit) model of market competition. This formulation is designed to represent 
decision making among competing options when only some characteristics of the options can be 
observed. 
 
MERGE 
The MERGE model (Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects of greenhouse gas 
reduction policies) is an integrated assessment model describing global energy-economy-climate 
interactions with regional detail. It was introduced by Manne et al.16 and has been continually 
developed since; a recently published description is in Blanford et al.33 MERGE is formulated as a multi-
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region dynamic general equilibrium model with an energy system of intermediate detail and a reduced-
form representation of the climate. It is solved as a sequential joint non-linear optimization with Negishi 
weights to balance inter-regional trade flows. The economy is represented as a top-down Ramsey model 
in which electric and non-electric energy inputs are traded off against capital and labor and production 
is allocated between consumption and investment. The energy system includes explicit technologies for 
electricity generation, refining, passenger vehicles, and other non-electric energy supply, with a 
resource extraction model for fossil fuels and uranium. 
 
WITCH 
WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid Model) is an energy-economy-climate model 
developed within FEEM's Sustainable Development research programme.34  
The model divides the worldwide economy into 13 regions, whose main macroeconomic variables are 
represented through a top-down inter-temporal optimal growth structure. This approach is 
complemented with a bottom-up like description of the energy sector, which details the energy 
production, and provides the energy input for the economic module and the resulting emission input for 
the climate module. The endogenous representation of R&D diffusion and innovation processes 
constitute a distinguishing feature of WITCH, allowing to describe how R&D investments in energy 
efficiency and carbon free technologies integrate the currently available mitigation options. 
The model can be used to evaluate the impacts of different climate policies on the optimal economic 
response over the century of the different regions. These can behave as forward-looking agents 
optimizing their welfare in a non-cooperative, simultaneous, open membership game with full 
information, or can be subject to a global social welfare planner in order to find a cooperative first-best 
optimal solution. In this game-theoretic set-up, regional strategic actions interrelate through GHG 
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emissions, dependence on exhaustible natural resources, trade of oil and carbon permits, and 
technological R&D spillovers.  
 
Comparison of models main exogenous assumptions and baselines 
The models’ assumptions have not been harmonized, in order to maintain the models’ own set 
of assumptions for the main exogenous drivers, such as population and to some extent GDP. 
The four models show similar patterns for business-as-usual emissions, population, and economic 
activity through 2030. The geographical distribution is also very similar across models. 
 GHG emissions differ across models, since this in an output parameter which depends on a 
variety of factors, including energy prices and techno-economic specification for the energy 
technologies. Global emissions are nonetheless similar across models, and somewhat above 60 GtCO2e 
by 2030, in line with the central projections of the IPCC WGIII (Chapter 6, Figure 6.5).  
 
 
Description of INDCs and their implementation in the models 
 
 Let us describe how we have used our four modeling tools in light of the reasons for economic 
analysis in INDC assessment elaborated above. We reviewed each country’s mitigation pledge in its INDC 
submission (http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/) and all modeling runs assume simultaneous 
implementation of all INDCs.  Implementation is assumed to minimize the costs necessary to achieve the 
emissions goal established in a respective country’s INDC. Many of the INDCs require economic 
forecasts to translate into levels as countries like China and India submitted mitigation pledges in terms 
of a reduction in emission intensity. We used the models’ GDP forecasts – coupled with the INDCs’ 
specified reductions – to estimate the effective emission levels in the INDCs. Using an internally 
consistent set of economic and emission forecasts can circumvent the potential problem in both 
comparing mitigation effort and assessing aggregate effects that arise when countries use different 
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economic and energy price assumptions in their own forecasts.   In each model we assume that 
countries implement their INDCs by minimizing total costs, which requires equating marginal abatement 
costs among all sources within a given country. Regarding the land use sector, the emissions reductions 
are implemented by applying the same tax as the energy system for the models representing land use. 
 To enable an apples-to-apples comparison and avoid potential bias owing to variation in target 
years, we have focused on the 2025-2030 average in our modeling results with the exception of results 
from the MERGE, which only reports output in 10-year time steps.  For multi-country regions in the 
models, we converted national pledges to emission limits and aggregated these to the regional level. 
The following  describes model-specific elements to the evaluation of the INDCs. 
 
DNE21+ 
Similarly, the implementation of the INDCs was carried out via emission caps on total country 
and (where countries are aggregated) regional level of GHG.  The forecasts were developed by RITE.  
Economic forecasts are consistent with the reference forecasts published by IEA and EIA.  Business-as-
usual emission forecasts are comparable to other energy-economy and IAM forecasts, except DNE21+ 
excludes explicit, existing climate policies.  In contrast to EIA and EIA emission forecasts, the DNE21+ 
approach gives credit to countries for those existing carbon pricing policies when measuring emission 
changes and costs against BAU forecasts. Each country or region implements its INDC with an economy-
wide carbon price necessary to meet the emission caps. 
 
GCAM 
Countries achieve their INDCs by means of a uniform price on carbon across sectors. All 2025 
and 2030 INDC goals are assumed to be met. The reference, business-as-usual scenario, does not 
include new climate policies implemented after 2010. The approach is consistent with many reference 
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scenarios in the literature, including the IPCC AR5 scenarios. The INDC scenarios include, where 
appropriate, the countries’ 2020 Copenhagen goals as well as their 2025/2030 INDC goals. The 
supplemental information for Fawcett et al.25 provides extensive detail on the reference and INDC 
scenarios.  
 
MERGE 
The following countries and regions have CO2-equivalent emission targets for 2030 based on 
their INDCs: the United States, the European Union, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and South 
Africa. For the United States, its 2025 target is extrapolated to 2030 to conform to the 10-year timestep 
of the model. China’s target is specified in terms of CO2-only emission intensity of GDP and peaking in 
2030 in carbon dioxide emissions. Where appropriate, 2020 targets based on the Copenhagen goals are 
assumed for these countries. An economy-wide carbon price is employed within each country (or, in the 
case of the EU, region) to deliver on the INDC emission goal.  
 
WITCH 
The implementation of the INDCs was carried out via emissions caps on the total regional level 
of GHG, with the exception of China where the limit was established only for CO2 as in the INDC. The 
reference case used was the SSP2 with business as usual (BAU) future projection, except when the BAU 
level was explicit in the INDC. The EU28 regional is divided in two regions for which the same relative 
emission target has been set and they are allowed to freely trade emission permits. The reported 
emissions include emissions from land use which are deduced from the market biomass price, in this 
setting these emissions are taxed at the same rate as the energy sector. The historical emissions used 
for reporting were the WDI and the FAO (for land use) databases. Each country or region implements its 
INDC with an economy-wide carbon price necessary to meet the emission caps.  
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Metrics 
Regarding the set of the metrics used, we define GHG emissions as the sum of the six Kyoto 
gases, thus excluding aerosols. DNE21+ assumes the INDC target is achieved by emission reductions 
excluding land use emissions, which are not modeled.  The GDP used in the intensity calculations is 
based on market exchange rates (MER). Prices in the models are expressed in 2005 USD, and measured 
at the secondary level for energy, which we have converted to 2015 USD using the GDP implicit price 
deflator. Economic costs are expressed as a share of GDP. 
 
Social Cost of Carbon Distribution 
We have extracted the 150,000 SCC estimates for the year 2030 based on a 3% discount rate 
from the most recent USG update of the social cost of carbon.35 The USG SCC estimates reflect the 
consideration of various degrees of parameter uncertainty in the three deterministic integrated 
assessment models used in the USG exercise. We have presented the mean SCC and the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the SCC distribution for 2030, converted from 2007 USD to 2015 USD using the GDP 
implicit price deflator (CEA 2016). While this represents one way of illustrating uncertainty in the SCC, it 
is important to recognize alternative approaches to incorporating uncertainty in the modeling 
framework – such as in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models26 – that may better represent 
how uncertainty influences the social cost of carbon.  
 
Distribution of Cost-Minimizing Path to Limiting Warming to 2⁰C 
We have extracted 186 marginal abatement cost estimates from the IPCC AR5 scenario database 
(https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/) for all model runs that would limit warming to no 
more than 2⁰C with at least a 50% probability. We have presented the mean value and the 10th and 90th 
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percentiles of this distribution for 2030, converted from 2005 USD to 2015 USD using the GDP implicit 
price deflator.36 
 
Caveats in Comparing Modeling Estimates to SCC and Cost-Minimizing Path to Limiting Warming to 
2⁰C 
 
 We have compared the modeling estimates of the INDCs using our four modeling platforms with 
the USG SCC estimates and the IPCC AR5 scenario database for model runs that would limit warming to 
no more than 2⁰C with at least a 50% probability. These comparisons are intended to be illustrative, but 
it is important to recognize several caveats. First, the underlying reference assumptions in our models 
differ from the underlying assumptions used in the SCC analyses and the AR5 modeling scenarios. The 
consideration of uncertainty also differs among these sets of analyses. Second, the SCCs represent the 
benefit of the first unit of emissions abatement while the marginal costs represent the costs of the last 
unit of abatement. These differences may be small for modest levels of emission abatement but large 
for globally significant levels of emission abatement. Finally, our modeling analyses and those in the AR5 
modeling scenarios assume idealized, economy-wide carbon pricing policies. Thus, the reported 
marginal and total costs of abatement in our modeling analyses and the AR5 scenarios may be lower 
than those associated with actual policy implementation.    
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